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FROM LAPDOG TO WATCHDOG: GIVING 
CITIZENS A VOICE IN MONITORING THE 
OIL INDUSTRY THROUGH RCACS 
Christina Marshall Santarpio* 
Abstract: Regional Citizens’ Advisory Councils in Alaska, created in the 
wake of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill of 1989, have provided citizens in 
Prince William Sound and Cook Inlet with a meaningful role in oil spill 
prevention and cleanup plans. Although the history of these RCACs show 
that their formation left room for improvement, in the wake of the Gulf 
Oil Spill of 2010, it is clear that innovative and creative solutions involving 
those most affected by oil spills are desperately needed throughout the 
country to prevent such disasters in the future. Moving forward, future 
RCACs should be created that build on the successes of the existing 
Councils, while fixing their three primary shortfalls: (1) their reliance on 
the oil industry for funding; (2) their “advisory” function limitations; and 
(3) their lack of subpoena power. 
Introduction 
 On April 20, 2010, an explosion at the Macondo Well in the Gulf 
of Mexico killed eleven workers and led to the Deepwater Horizon 
Spill, the largest oil spill in the history of the United States.1 Contrac-
tors for BP were cementing a newly dug well when a buildup in meth-
ane gas resulted in an explosion and fire that destroyed the drilling 
                                                                                                                      
* Managing Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2012–
2013. 
1 Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drill-
ing, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, Re-
port to the President, at vi–vii (2011), [hereinafter Gulf Final Report], available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION. 
pdf. In a speech, President Barack Obama deemed the spill the “worst environmental dis-
aster America has ever faced” just two months after the explosion and before the well was 
repaired and oil stopped gushing out of it. Address to the Nation on the Oil Spill in the 
Gulf of Mexico, 2010 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 502 ( June 15, 2010). 
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rig.2 Responders were unable to fully seal the well for three months, 
during which time five million barrels of oil spilled into the Gulf.3 
 The media response to the Deepwater Horizon spill was instanta-
neous and strong.4 The New York Times alone published almost one 
thousand articles mentioning the oil spill from April 2010 through 
March 2012.5 At first, media outlets focused on the explosion itself and 
the resulting deaths.6 As months passed, however, as became clear that 
original estimates of the extent of the spill were vastly underestimated, 
comparisons to the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster began to surface.7 
 On March 24, 1989, a supertanker owned by Exxon Mobil Corpo-
ration (“Exxon”) grounded into a reef in Prince William Sound, 
Alaska.8 The 900-foot tanker spilled eleven million gallons of crude oil, 
harming roughly 1300 miles of ecologically rich shoreline areas in the 
process.9 The ramifications of the spill were severe and long-lasting: 
250,000 seabirds, 2800 sea otters, 300 harbor seals, 250 bald eagles, 22 
killer whales, and billions of salmon and herring eggs died as a result.10 
These deaths also severely harmed the economies of nearby towns, 
which relied primarily on commercial fishing and tourism.11 
 The Exxon Valdez disaster immediately resulted in a media frenzy, 
as citizens, interest groups, and the media tried to piece together the 
events and oversights that culminated in the destruction of a previously 
                                                                                                                      
2 Alyson C. Flournoy, Three Meta-Lessons Government and Industry Should Learn from the 
BP Deepwater Horizon Disaster and Why They Will Not, 38 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 281, 281 
(2011). 
3 Id. at 281–82. 
4 See, e.g., Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill (2010), N.Y. Times, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/ 
reference/timestopics/subjects/o/oil_spills/gulf_of_mexico_2010/index.html (last up-
dated Apr. 24, 2012). 
5 See id. 
6 See, e.g., Campbell Robertson, 11 Remain Missing After Oil Rig Explodes Off Louisiana; 
17 Are Hurt, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 2010, at A13. Initially, officials believed that the resulting 
pollution would be minimal and that the fire from the explosion was burning most of the 
oil and gas. Id. 
7 See, e.g., Justin Gillis, Doubts Are Raised on Accuracy of Government’s Spill Estimate, N.Y. 
Times, May 14, 2010, at A1. BP admitted to Congress that their worst-case scenario envi-
sioned sixty thousand barrels flowing out of the leak per day; this would approximate an 
Exxon Valdez-sized spill every four days. Id. at A13. 
8 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 476 (2008). 
9 Id. at 476, 478; History of PWSRCAC and the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Prince William 
Sound Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council, [hereinafter History of PWSRCAC], 
http://www.pwsrcac.org/about/history.html (last updated Jan. 25, 2011). 
10 History of PWSRCAC, supra note 9. Moreover, not all of these species have fully recov-
ered from the spill. Id. 
11 See id. 
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pristine natural setting.12 Within sixteen months, Congress enacted the 
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA),13 expanding the government’s finan-
cial capacity to respond to oil spills, broadening requirements for gov-
ernment and oil industry contingency plans, and heightening fines for 
noncompliance with new regulations.14 
 Both spills resulted in the creation of a commission to investigate 
the events leading up to the disasters, and their long- and short-term 
effects on industry and the environment.15 In Alaska, one long-lasting 
and meaningful result of the official report was the formation of two 
Regional Citizens’ Advisory Councils (RCACs) in the Prince William 
Sound and Cook Inlet.16 These councils have since provided an innova-
tive check on the relationship between government and the oil indus-
try in Alaska by bringing citizens—who stand to lose the most from fu-
ture spills—into the decision-making process.17 Although the Councils 
have not been as effective as they could feasibly become, they have im-
proved the oil industry in Alaska since 1990.18 
 The BP Deepwater Horizon blowout similarly spurred the creation 
of a commission to investigate and provide suggestions to prevent fu-
ture tragedies in the Gulf of Mexico.19 Unlike the Exxon Valdez Com-
mission, however, this commission’s recommendations to create re-
gional citizens’ councils in the area have as yet gone unheeded.20 This 
Note provides a framework for the successful implementation of 
RCACs beyond Alaska by comparing the two existing Councils and ana-
lyzing how they can improve. 
 Part I traces the development of RCACs in response to the 1989 
Exxon Valdez oil spill.21 Immediately following the spill, the oil industry 
                                                                                                                      
12 See Molly J. Walker Wilson & Megan P. Fuchs, Publicity, Pressure, and Environmental Legis-
lation: The Untold Story of Availability Campaigns, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 2147, 2201 (2009). 
13 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified as amended 
at 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2762 (2006)). 
14 Wilson & Fuchs, supra note 12, at 2202; see infra notes 51–60 and accompanying text. 
15 See Exec. Order No. 13,543, 75 Fed. Reg. 29,397 (May 21, 2010); Alaska Stat. 
§ 01.10.070(c) (1989) (repealed 1990), available at http://www.pwsrcac.org/docs/pwsrcac 
info/006.AOSC_Legislation.pdf. 
16 See 33 U.S.C. § 2732(d); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The Exxon Valdez Resurfaces in the Gulf of 
Mexico . . . And the Hazards of “Megasystem Centripetal Di-Polarity”, 38 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 
391, 395 (2011). 
17 See 33 U.S.C. § 2732(d); Plater, supra note 16. 
18 See infra notes 106–201 and accompanying text. 
19 Exec. Order No. 13,543, 75 Fed. Reg. at 29,397; The President’s Weekly Address, 
2010 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 411 (May 22, 2010), available at http://www.oilspillcommis 
sion.gov/sites/default/files/documents/osc_presidential_announcement.pdf. 
20 See infra notes 218–241 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 29–111 and accompanying text. 
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in the Prince William Sound created a contract with citizens of the area 
to act as the first RCAC, an organization that was later codified by the 
OPA in 1990.22 Part II describes the successes, failures, and limitations 
of the two most prominent RCACs in existence today: the Prince Wil-
liam Sound RCAC and Cook Inlet RCAC.23 Although these councils 
have generally had a positive impact on local and federal government 
actions, their structure has imposed significant limitations on their ef-
fectiveness.24 Part III first addresses why RCACs have not expanded sig-
nificantly since 1990, and then examines the most recent meaningful 
attempt to create a new RCAC in the Gulf of Mexico following the 
Deepwater Horizon blowout in 2010.25 Part IV analyzes and critiques 
the existing Alaska RCACs, and provides a framework for future citizens’ 
councils that improves upon the existing configuration.26 The three 
biggest limitations of the two Alaska RCACs all stem from their forma-
tion: lack of subpoena power, limited advisory function, and reliance on 
the oil industry for funding.27 This Note argues that with the removal of 
these barriers, RCACs could play a significant role in monitoring the oil 
industry and ensuring that tragedies such as the BP Deepwater Horizon 
blowout and the Exxon Valdez oil spill never happen again.28 
I. The Development of RCACs as a Response to  
the Exxon Valdez Spill 
A. The State of Alaska Oil Spill Commission: Final Report 
 Following the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the Alaska legislature created 
the Alaska Oil Spill Commission (the “Alaska Commission”) to answer 
the prominent question of “how things went wrong.”29 The Alaska 
Commission comprised seven members, five of whom were citizens of 
                                                                                                                      
22 See infra notes 89–111 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 112–201 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 166–201 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 202–241 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 242–315 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 245–276 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 277–315 and accompanying text. 
29 Alaska Oil Spill Comm’n, SPILL: The Wreck of the Exxon Valdez: Implications 
for Safe Transportation of Oil, Final Report, at iii (1990), available at http://www.wash 
ingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/oil-spill/docs/alaska-commission-report.pdf. The Act estab-
lishing the Commission stated its purpose was to “investigate the Exxon Valdez oil spill disas-
ter and to recommend changes needed to minimize the possibility and effects of similar oil 
spills.” Alaska Stat. § 01.10.070(c) (1989) (repealed 1990), available at http://www.pwsrcac. 
org/docs/pwsrcacinfo/006.AOSC_Legislation.pdf. 
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Alaska and all of whom had specialized knowledge about oil and the 
state itself.30 After extensive research, the Alaska Commission submit-
ted a report to the Alaska governor and legislature summarizing its 
analysis of the oil spill and proposing approaches to improve regulation 
of the oil industry and prevent future spills.31 
                                                                                                                     
 Although the spill has been blamed on an alcoholic captain, Jo-
seph Hazelwood,32 the Final Report showed that circumstances sur-
rounding the disaster were much more complicated.33 The Alaska 
Commission concluded the spill was “the result of the gradual degrada-
tion of oversight and safety practices that had been intended, twelve 
years before, to safeguard and backstop the inevitable mistakes of hu-
man beings.”34 To cut costs, Exxon had reduced drastically the number 
of crewmembers on tankers.35 Although tankers transporting 6.3 mil-
lion gallons of oil in the 1950s used a forty-member crew, the Exxon 
Valdez had only nineteen crewmembers and fifty-three million gallons 
of oil to transport.36 It is perhaps not surprising that the officer on the 
 
30 Alaska Oil Spill Comm’n, supra note 29, at ix. Walter Parker, the chair, was the 
former technical staff director of Alaska’s Office of Pipeline Coordinator and the current 
president of the Alaska Academy of Engineering and Sciences; Esther Wunnicke, the vice 
chair, was an attorney and the Commissioner of the Alaska Department of Natural Re-
sources in the 1980s; Margaret Hayes was a geologist and former director of the Alaska 
Department of Natural Resources Division of Land and Water Management; Tim Wallis 
was president of a consulting firm and former state legislator; John Sund was a lawyer, 
former state legislator, and commercial fisherman; Edward Wenk, Jr. was a professor at the 
University of Washington and former advisor to three presidents and congress; and Mi-
chael Hertz was the director of the San Fransisco Bay-Delta Preservation Association and 
monitored and studied previous oil and chemical spills. Id. 
31 Id. at 3–4. 
32 See Baker, 554 U.S. at 476–77. Evidence presented to blame Hazelwood included the 
following facts: Hazelwood had completed a twenty-eight day alcohol treatment program 
while employed by Exxon but did not attend the follow-up program or Alcoholics Anony-
mous meetings; Hazelwood had been seen drinking publicly and aboard Exxon tankers 
following his release from the program; members of Exxon management knew and drank 
with Hazelwood; Exxon did not monitor Hazelwood’s drinking on board; witnesses testi-
fied to seeing Hazelwood drink at least five double vodkas before leaving port on the night 
of the spill. Id. 
33 See Alaska oil Spill Comm’n, supra note 29, at 7, 206. 
34 Id. at 7. Moreover, in evaluating the spill containment and response capability in 
Prince William Sound, the Commission found that both were “fundamentally flawed.” Id. 
at 167. 
35 See id. at 11–12. 
36 Id. at 11. The small crew of nineteen had been certified by the Coast Guard, but was 
later criticized—the Commission suggested that the smal crew size may have contributed 
to crew fatigue. Id. at 11–12. 
302 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 40:297 
bridge at the time of the crash may have been awake and working for 
the preceding eighteen hours.37 
 The Alaska Commission further noted that observance of the rules 
established in 1977, when tanker operations began in Valdez, should 
have prevented an oil spill.38 Due to oil industry lobbying and lawsuits, 
however, the state could not enforce these rules.39 When shippers 
stopped following the rules, therefore, the Coast Guard could not and 
did not enforce them.40 The present system did not provide a signifi-
cant enough deterrent to prevent oil spills, and thus the Commission 
called for a complete reform.41 
 Fundamentally, the Alaska Commission found the spill was almost 
a certainty: “Success bred complacency; complacency bred neglect; ne-
glect increased the risk—until the right combination of errors finally 
led to an accident of disastrous proportions.”42 Although particular 
spills could be addressed individually, the Alaska Commission’s report 
called for a complete overhaul, aimed at the systemic reduction of risk, 
so that similar situations would not repeat and result in another spill.43 
 The Alaska Commission recommended citizen supervision of spe-
cific government agencies because failures in the oil transportation in-
dustry directly harm citizens.44 In contrast, the oil industry primarily 
concerns itself with profitability and supports deregulation due to com-
petition in the market, and thus often directly opposes environmental 
safety measures.45 To that end, the Alaska Commission specifically rec-
ommended the creation of a citizens’ advisory council to supervise the 
transportation of oil, gas, and any other hazardous substance.46 
                                                                                                                      
37 See id. at 11 (summarizing testimony before the National Transportation Safety Board). 
Hazelwood had gone to his cabin to do paperwork twenty minutes before the accident, and 
the third mate, Cousins, did not follow Hazelwood’s directive to return to tanker lanes. 
Sharon Bushell & Stan Jones, The Spill: Personal Stories from the Exxon Valdez 
Disaster 22 (Ellen Wheat ed., 2009). 
38 See Alaska Oil Spill Comm’n, supra note 29, at iv. 
39 See id. In addition, these rules were “consistently violated . . . to insure that tankers 
passing through Prince William Sound did not lose time by slowing down for ice or waiting 
for winds to abate. Concern for profits in the 1980s obliterated concern for safe operations 
that existed in 1977.” Id. 
40 Id. 
41 See id. at iv–v. 
42 Id. at 206. Furthermore, “[a]ll parties—the shippers, Alyeska, the Coast Guard and 
the State of Alaska—shared in the complacency that produced this result.” Id. 
43 See id. at 210. 
44 See Alaska Oil Spill Comm’n, supra note 29, at 131. 
45 Id. at 134 (“An industry ideology that regulation is a nuisance can drive an industry 
attitude that the objectives of regulation are also a nuisance.”). 
46 Id. at 139. 
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 The Alaska Commission envisioned a council composed of a full-
time director and staff, chosen from the citizenry of Alaska, to “provide 
focus to state oversight.”47 It recommended the council have subpoena 
power to inspect, investigate, and collect information on facilities and 
the industry.48 The Alaska Commission outlined nine duties of the 
council, all aimed at proper supervision of the “environmentally safe 
transportation of Alaska’s resources.”49 The council would become a 
meaningful intermediary between the oil industry and the govern-
ment, and ensure the involvement of individuals with the most knowl-
edge and the most to lose from another disaster.50 
B. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
1. An Overview of the OPA 
 Congress enacted the OPA in August 1990 to better enable the 
federal government to avoid and address oil spills.51 Attempts at the 
federal level to enact such comprehensive legislation over oil control 
had failed in the past because of concerns over preempting existing 
state laws.52 Some members of Congress wanted to impose uniform re-
quirements for liability to “‘allow for quick and complete payment of 
reasonable claims without resort to cumbersome litigation.’”53 Other 
lawmakers called for a federal law that would merely establish the floor 
and permit states to set more stringent standards on the oil industry.54 
                                                                                                                      
47 Id. 
48 See id. 
49 See id. at 139–40. The council was to advise government officials on environmental 
implications of transporting Alaskan oil, gas, and other substances; come up with initiatives 
for the state and federal government and represent state interests in developing treaties 
and compacts; identify any remaining issues and recommend ways to fix them; work to-
ward the coordination of spill prevention and response programs; recommend budget and 
resource allocation changes; analyze existing programs; recommend changes based on 
new scientific findings; create advisory panels; and issue annual reports and safety assess-
ments to the governor, including statistics on risks, performance, and improvements. Id. 
50 See Alaska Oil Spill Comm’n, supra note 29, at 139–40. 
51 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified as amended at 
33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2762 (2006)); Oil Pollution Act Overview, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, 
http://www.epa.gov/OEM/content/lawsregs/opaover.htm (last updated Jan. 28, 2011). 
52 See George J. Mitchell, Preservation of State and Federal Authority Under the Oil Pollution 
Act of 1990, 21 Envtl. L. 237, 237 (1991). 
53 Id. at 239 (quoting 135 Cong. Rec. H8129 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1989) (statement of Rep. 
Hammerschmidt)). 
54 Id. 
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As passed, the OPA preserves the ability of states to enact laws for oil 
spill prevention and response.55 
 In addition to expanding the federal government’s ability to re-
spond to and assess damages for oil spills, the OPA ensures compliance 
and pre-spill safety measures through strict liability provisions.56 The 
OPA imposes strict liability on polluters to pay for cleanup costs and 
damages resulting from spills in an effort to avoid passing these costs on 
to taxpayers.57 The OPA also established the National Oil Spill Liability 
Trust Fund to compensate those harmed by oil spills quickly and com-
pletely.58 Finally, the OPA imposed a three-level change to the existing 
National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan 
(NCP), involving the federal government, Area Committees (made up 
of federal, state, and local officials), and owners and operators of the 
vessels themselves.59 The NCP now requires oil companies to prepare 
individual response plans for spills and any other serious threat to the 
environment in concert with local government response plans, so that 
future oil spills can be dealt with more quickly and effectively.60 
2. Regional Citizens’ Advisory Councils 
 Congress divided the OPA into subchapters that each aim to im-
prove the government’s control over oil spills in different ways.61 Sub-
chapter II, Prince William Sound Provisions, establishes various moni-
toring and research institutes and committees whose purposes are to 
                                                                                                                      
55 33 U.S.C § 2718(a) (“Nothing in this Act . . . shall . . . affect, or be construed or in-
terpreted as preempting, the authority of any State or political subdivision thereof from 
imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect to [oil pollution] . . . .”); 
accord Mitchell, supra note 52. 
56 See 33 U.S.C. § 2702; Mitchell, supra note 52, at 251; Andrew F. Popper, Capping In-
centives, Capping Innovation, Courting Disaster: The Gulf Oil Spill and Arbitrary Limits on Civil 
Liability, 60 DePaul L. Rev. 975, 979–80 (2011). 
57 See Mitchell, supra note 52, at 251; Popper, supra note 56. 
58 Oil Pollution Act Overview, supra note 51. The Fund provides up to one billion dollars 
per spill if the responsible party cannot be identified or cannot pay for the cleanup. Oil 
Spill Liability Trust Fund, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/OEM/ 
content/learning/oilfund.htm (last updated Jan. 27, 2011). 
59 Oil Pollution Act Overview, supra note 51. 
60 See id. The federal government directs public and private parties in carrying out these 
response plans. Id. For a discussion of government procedures regarding response plans for 
oil spills in general, see Christopher M. Iaquinto, A Silent Spring in Deep Water?: Proposing Front-
End Regulation of Dispersants After the Deepwater Horizon Disaster, 39 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 
419, 419–48 (2012). 
61 See Oil Prevention Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2762 (2006). 
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research the prevention, control, and impact of Alaska oil spills.62 In 
addition, Subchapter II called for the creation of two RCACs in Alaska, 
incorporating individual citizens into this new governmental frame-
work of monitoring.63 This innovative approach to future monitoring 
sought to incorporate Alaska residents into “watchdog councils” who 
could monitor the oil industry from a new and unique perspective— 
those who stood to be the most harmed by future oil spills.64 The OPA 
authorized two RCACs: one for Prince William Sound, and one for 
Cook Inlet.65 
 The statutory authorization of the Councils provided legitimacy 
and attempted to guarantee that their work would be incorporated into 
the oil industry’s future decisions.66 Moreover, the source of their fund-
ing—those corporations utilizing the Cook Inlet and Prince William 
Sound terminals for their oil tankers—guaranteed the RCACs sufficient 
funds to perform necessary research.67 To ensure the RCACs’ survival, 
Congress mandated funding as a prerequisite for the validity of the oil 
industry’s contingency plans.68 Congress reassesses funding for the 
RCACs on an annual basis.69 The OPA provides that the Prince William 
Sound RCAC (PWSRCAC) may receive up to $2 million per year, and 
the Cook Inlet RCAC (CIRCAC) may receive up to $1 million per 
                                                                                                                      
62 See id. §§ 2731–2738. Although the OPA is a federal statute designed to cover oil 
spills throughout the United States, the Act devotes a significant portion of its text to pro-
visions limited to Cook Inlet and Prince William Sound alone. See id.; Oil Pollution Act Over-
view, supra note 51. This geographical restriction may be at least partly attributed to Capi-
tol lobbying. Plater, supra note 16, at 411. 
63 33 U.S.C. § 2732(d). 
64 See id.; Plater, supra note 16, at 410–11. An illustration of the severe need for this 
new form of regulation can be found in the Exxon Valdez disaster itself. See Zygmunt J.B. 
Plater, Facing a Time of Counter-Revolution—The Kepone Incident and a Review of First Principles, 
29 U. Rich. L. Rev. 657, 699–700 (1995). After the tanker ran aground and began spilling 
out oil, Exxon took control of the response operation, but had no training in proper re-
sponse techniques. Id. Officials did nothing for two days (during which, thanks to a fortui-
tous period of calm air, the oil could have been contained). Id. Finally, local fishermen 
insisted on attending an official meeting between Exxon, Alaskan state officials, and the 
U.S. Coast Guard, and were able to establish a “strategy for prioritizing the response ef-
forts.” Id. With the help of private fishing boats, response efforts began the next morning. 
Id. Unfortunately at this point it was too late to save some islands. Id. 
65 33 U.S.C. § 2732(d). 
66 See id. 
67 See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2732(k)(2)–(3) (2006). 
68 See id. § 2732(k)(1) (“Approval of the contingency plans required of owners and op-
erators of the Cook Inlet and Prince William Sound terminal facilities and crude oil tank-
ers while operating in Alaskan waters in commerce with those terminal facilities shall be 
effective only so long as the respective Association and Council for a facility are funded 
pursuant to paragraph (2).”). 
69 Id. § 2732(k). 
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year.70 Because the PWSRCAC was established before the enactment of 
the OPA, its funding procedures differ and its contract with the Alyeska 
Pipeline provides a guaranteed yearly budget.71 In contrast, the CIR-
CAC must negotiate with the oil industry for funding and has no set 
income.72 
 The OPA sets forth guidelines for the membership of each RCAC, 
ensuring that they will be made up of Alaska residents (with voting 
power) as well as nonvoting representatives from federal agencies.73 
The governor of Alaska appoints members from the general popula-
tion, taking into account a need for “regional balance.”74 The Council 
must have a representative for a variety of local interests, including lo-
cal commercial fishing industry organizations; aquaculture associations, 
Alaska Native organizations, environmental organizations, recreational 
organizations, the Alaska State Chamber of Commerce, and nearby 
municipalities.75 The nonvoting members are representatives of the 
EPA, U.S. Coast Guard, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion, U.S. Forest Services, Bureau of Land Management, Alaska De-
partment of Environmental Conservation, Alaska Department of Fish 
and Game, Alaska Department of Natural Resources, and the Division 
of Emergency Services, Alaska Department of Military and Veterans 
Affairs.76 The governor appoints each voting member of an RCAC to 
serve for three years.77 
                                                                                                                      
70 Id. § 2732(k)(2)–(3). Currently, the PWSRCAC has a budget of $2.9 million per 
year, while the CIRCAC’s budget for 2012 is at least $967,000 (the most recent budget 
contract set their 2010 minimum funding levels at $967,000, to be adjusted upward for 
inflation in 2011 and increased by 2.2% in 2012). See Prince William Sound Regional Citi-
zens’ Advisory Council (PWSRCAC) Charter Renewal, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,506, 24,506 (Dep’t 
of Homeland Sec. May 2, 2011); CIRCAC 2011 Recertification, Appendix B: Funding Con-
tract, Cook Inlet Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council 3 (Aug. 12, 2009), http://www. 
circac.org/documents/pdf/circac/Appendix%20B.pdf. 
71 See Contract Between Regional Citizens Advisory Committee and Alyeska Pipeline Service Com-
pany, Prince William Sound Regional Citizens Advisory Council 1 (Feb. 8, 1990), 
[hereinafter RCAC Alyeska Contract], http://www.pwsrcac.org/docs/d0000100.pdf; infra notes 
97–101 and accompanying text. 
72 Naomi Klouda, CIRCAC Removes Shavelson, Homer Trib. (Sept. 8, 2010), http:// 
homertribune.com/2010/09/circac-removes-shavelson. 
73 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2732(d)(2) (2006). The statute does not allow 
for oil industry representatives to participate in the membership of the councils, even in a 
non-voting capacity. See id. (listing members of the councils and notably leaving out oil 
industry representatives). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. § 2732(d)(2)(A). 
76 Id. § 2732(d)(2)(B). 
77 Id. § 2732(d)(3)(B). The only exception to the three-year rule was for initial ap-
pointments, which were staggered and shorter. Id. § 2732(d)(3)(C). 
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 Each RCAC is statutorily authorized to exist for the life of the 
Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (and as long as oil is transported near 
Cook Inlet), ensuring that the oil industry in Alaska will always be sub-
ject to oversight.78 The OPA allows the RCACs to self-govern: they may 
elect their own chairperson, hire staff members, and determine their 
own internal operating procedures following the initial formation 
meeting.79 The statute also includes a conflict of interest prohibition: 
no member may simultaneously “be engaged in any activity which 
might conflict with such individual carrying out his functions as a 
member thereof.”80 
 The OPA outlines the duties of RCACs, which are generally to im-
prove spill prevention measures and control the oil industry’s impact on 
the environment in the area.81 The RCACs advise their Oil Terminal 
Facilities and Oil Tanker Operations Association (“Association”) on po-
tential policies, permits, or regulations that could have an effect on the 
local environment.82 In addition, RCACs monitor the environmental 
effects of terminal facilities, crude oil tankers, and the operation and 
maintenance of these facilities.83 The RCACs also review prevention and 
response plans for Prince William Sound and Cook Inlet, and may make 
recommendations regarding permitting standards, facility operations, 
tanker operations, and prevention and contingency plans in order to 
improve safety.84 If the Association does not adopt the recommendation 
of the RCAC, it must provide a reason for the rejection.85 
 The statute mandates federal agency cooperation with RCACs by 
requiring that agencies consult with the Councils about any potential 
agency action that could have an effect on permitting or certain regula-
                                                                                                                      
78 See id. § 2732(d)(3)(A). 
79 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2732(d)(4) (2006). 
80 Id. § 2732(d)(5). 
81 Plater, supra note 16, at 412. 
82 33 U.S.C. § 2732(c), (d)(6)(A). The Associations were also created by the OPA in 
order to “review[] policies relating to the operation and maintenance of the oil terminal 
facilities and crude oil tankers which affect or may affect the environment in the vicinity of 
their respective terminals.” Id. § 2732(c)(3). The Associations have four members each: a 
representative of the terminal facilities, a representative of the crude oil tankers, a repre-
sentative of Alaska state government, and a representative of the federal government. Id. 
§ 2732(c)(2). 
83 Id. § 2732(d)(6)(B)–(C). 
84 Id. § 2732(d)(6)(D)–(F). 
85 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2732(h) (2006) (“In the event that the Asso-
ciation does not adopt, or significantly modifies before adoption, any recommendation of 
the Council . . . the Association shall provide to the Council, in writing, within 5 days of its 
decision, notice of its decision and a written statement of reasons for its rejection or sig-
nificant modification of the recommendation.”). 
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tions in Alaska.86 The consultation must include allowing the RCAC to 
review the changes and make relevant recommendations.87 However, in 
this relationship—as in their relationship with the Associations—the 
Councils’ roles are merely advisory.88 
C. The Contract Between Regional Citizens’ Advisory Committee and Alyeska 
Pipeline Service Company 
 On February 8, 1990, one month after the publication of the 
Commission’s Final Report on the Exxon Valdez disaster, and before 
Congress enacted the OPA, the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company (“Al-
yeska”) signed a contract (the “Contract”) with a newly formed Regional 
Citizens Advisory Committee (the “Committee”).89 The Contract au-
thorized the Committee—an independent body—to monitor the oil 
industry, as called for by the Commission’s Final Report.90 
 Article I of the Contract establishes the Committee’s independ-
ence, and prohibits Alyeska from any leadership or controlling role 
within the Committee.91 The Committee promised to advise Alyeska in 
return for the oil company’s unconditional grant of independence and 
pledge of permanent funding.92 
 The Contract provided that the Committee would perform essen-
tial services for the public and Alyeska.93 In addition, the Contract in-
corporated Alyeska’s Prince William Sound Tanker Spill Prevention 
and Response Plan, about which the Committee was to provide rec-
ommendations to Alyeska regarding development, review, research pro-
jects, and any other important issues.94 The Contract placed a signifi-
cant limitation on the Committee after listing this relatively expansive 
                                                                                                                      
86 Id. § 2732(g). 
87 Id. 
88 See 33 U.S.C. § 2732(g). 
89 See Alaska Oil Spill Comm’n, supra note 29; Klouda, supra note 72; RCAC Alyeska 
Contract, supra note 71. 
90 Alaska Oil Spill Comm’n, supra note 29, at 139–40; RCAC Alyeska Contract, supra 
note 71, at 1–2. 
91 RCAC Alyeska Contract, supra note 71, at 2. The Contract created the Committee as a 
nonprofit corporation, prohibited Alyeska from membership on the Committee and its 
board of directors, and contained a provision directing that it “shall be interpreted in such 
a way as to promote the independence . . . of the Committee.” Id. 
92 Id. 
93 See id. at 3. These services include: reviewing and monitoring oil spill prevention 
and response plans, educating the public about these response and prevention methods, 
advising Alyeska on the “environmental, social, and economic consequences” of oil-related 
projects and accidents, and researching mitigation methods for oil-related accidents. Id. 
94 See id. at 1, 4. 
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list of duties by stating that “[t]he function of the Committee under 
this Contract is not regulatory, but is advisory only.”95 Therefore, de-
spite the fact that Alyeska pledged to “respond in a timely manner” to 
the Committee’s recommendations, the Contract did not compel Aly-
eska to implement any of them.96 
 The Contract also outlined the funding procedures for the Com-
mittee.97 Alyeska promised to fund the Committee with a minimum of 
two million dollars per year (adjusted for inflation in the future) for 
“operations, technical studies, and expert support.”98 The Contract ex-
plicitly forbade the Committee from using its funding for any activities 
outside of those described by the Contract.99 Although this permitted 
the Committee to use funds for studies of human impacts of future 
spills, it did not include “attorney’s fees, litigation consultants or wit-
nesses, studies . . . expert witnesses, or other litigation costs in connec-
tion with litigation against Alyeska” or arising out of the Exxon Valdez 
disaster.100 In addition, the Contract compelled the Committee and 
Alyeska to renegotiate funding amounts every three years.101 
                                                                                                                     
 The Contract gave relatively broad access rights to the Commit-
tee.102 It required Alyeska provide, upon request, any records and 
documents that the Committee considered “reasonably necessary” to 
“perform its duties.”103 This right of access could not exceed that of the 
EPA and other government agencies with regulatory authority, and ex-
cluded confidential personnel data, anything protected by attorney-
client privilege, and any confidential information of which competitor 
might take advantage.104 Alyeska had to provide requested documents 
within a “reasonable” amount of time, but the subchapter did not de-
fine a timeframe.105 In addition to documents and records, the Com-
 
95 See id. at 4–5. 
96 See id. 
97 RCAC Alyeska Contract, supra note 71, at 8. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 2, 5. While the Committee can “engage in activities outside of its contractual 
obligations to Alyeska; . . . any such activities shall not be paid for by funds provided by 
Alyeska.” Id. at 2. 
100 Id. at 5. 
101 Id. at 8. These negotiations were to be conducted in “good faith” by both parties. 
Id. If they could not agree on an amount, the parties were to turn to a third-party arbitra-
tor, who could not change the funding amount by more than fifty percent in either direc-
tion. Id. at 9. 
102 See id. at 10. 
103 RCAC Alyeska Contrat, supra note 71, at 10. 
104 See id. If the Committee signed confidentiality agreements, however, they could ac-
cess confidential information. See id. at 10–11. 
105 See id. at 10–11. 
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mittee could inspect Alyeska facilities as long as it provided advance 
notice, and could photograph or videotape such visits.106 The Contract 
also allowed the Committee limited access in an environmental emer-
gency, as long as it did not impede response efforts in the process.107 
 Finally, in anticipation of a potential statutory requirement for 
RCACs, the Contract included a stipulation that, should legislation be 
enacted for the formation of a citizens’ advisory group, Alyeska would 
assist the Committee to qualify as such a group.108 After Congress 
passed the OPA, the Committee did make such an effort and became 
certified as an alternative voluntary advisory group,109 pursuant to the 
Act.110 In the Committee’s most recent Charter Renewal, dated May 2, 
2011, the Coast Guard reiterated that, while the PWSRCAC predates 
the passage of the OPA, it is “operate[d] in a fashion that is broadly 
consistent with OPA” and still funded by Alyeska.111 
II. The Successes and Limitations of Existing RCACs 
A. Prince William Sound Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council: Successes and 
Improvements to Oil Spill Prevention and Response 
 The mission statement of the Prince William Sound Regional 
RCAC (PWSRCAC or “Prince William Sound Council”) is for “citizens 
[to] promot[e] environmentally safe operation of the Alyeska Pipeline 
marine terminal in Valdez and the oil tankers that use it.”112 It consid-
ers the protection of the citizens of Prince William Sound the most im-
                                                                                                                      
106 Id. at 11–12. 
107 Id. at 12. Such emergencies included “oil spills, significant pollution incidents, or 
other actual or threatened major environmental harm.” Id. 
108 Id. at 13–14. 
109 Certification of Alternative Advisory Group in Lieu of a Council, 57 Fed. Reg. 
14,440, 14,440 (Apr. 20, 1992); see Guidelines for Recertification of Alternative Voluntary 
Groups in Lieu of a Council, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,600, 62,600 (Dec. 31, 1992). 
110 33 U.S.C. § 2732(o) (2006) (“The requirements of . . . this section . . . are deemed 
to have been satisfied . . . [w]ith respect to the Prince William Sound Program, the Alyeska 
Pipeline Service Company or any of its owner companies enters into a contract for the 
duration of the operation of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System with the Alyeska Citizens 
Advisory Committee in existence on August 18, 1990, or a successor organization, to fund 
that Committee or organization on an annual basis in the amount provided for by subsec-
tion (k)(2)(A) of this section . . . .”). 
111 Prince William Sound Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council (PWSRCAC) Charter 
Renewal, 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,506. 
112 About the Council, Prince Wm. Sound Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council, 
http://www.pwsrcac.org/about/index.html (last updated Sept. 27, 2012). 
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portant aspect of its endeavors, and holds the prevention of future oil 
spills as paramount in its efforts.113 
 In 2009, twenty years after the Exxon Valdez disaster, the PWS-
RCAC released a report outlining changes in the Prince William 
Sound and the oil industry, highlighting both improvements and fac-
tors that required further research and change.114 The report organ-
ized the changes into three categories: prevention, response, and en-
vironment.115 
 Beyond this report and other material the PWSRCAC publishes on 
its website, there are limited in-depth analyses of the Prince William 
Sound Council’s effectiveness since its inception in 1991.116 One such 
analysis is a study written by George Busenberg, which investigated the 
effectiveness of both Alaska councils from 1990 through 2004.117 
Busenberg measured the councils’ effectiveness based on their success 
in seeing policy changes from conception to implementation.118 Ex-
panded funding and technical assistance improves efficiency, as does 
the PWSRCAC’s ability to work with other organizations to build sup-
port for their initiatives.119 Busenberg identified six areas in which the 
PWSRCAC has initiated major projects: research on the environment, 
oil disaster response research, detection of ice, weather reporting, oil 
terminal and tanker fires, and tug escorts.120 
1. Safety Improvements in Prince William Sound: Prevention and 
Response Measures 
 Acknowledging that “[t]he oil spill that never happens is the easi-
est to clean up,” the PWSRCAC identified new safety improvements 
aimed at reducing the risk of another oil spill.121 The Prince William 
Sound Council highlighted industry-wide improvements such as rein-
forced, double-hulled tankers, an improved tug escort system, manda-
                                                                                                                      
113 See id. 
114 Prince William Sound Reg’l Citizens’ Advisory Council, Then & Now: Changes 
in Prince William Sound Crude Oil Transportation Since the Exxon Valdez Oil 
Spill: 1989–2009, at 3 (2009), available at http://www.pwsrcac.org/docs/d0064000.pdf. 
115 See id. at 2. 
116 See Plater, supra note 16, at 411 & n.103. 
117 See George J. Busenberg, Citizen Participation and Collaborative Environmental Man-
agement in the Marine Oil Trade of Coastal Alaska, 35 Coastal Mgmt. 239, 240 (2007). 
118 Id. 
119 See id. These two theories, “resources hypothesis” and “collaborative capacity,” form 
the basis of Busenberg’s analytical framework. See id. 
120 Id. at 242. 
121 Prince William Sound Reg’l Citizens’ Advisory Council, supra note 114, at 4. 
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tory alcohol tests for captains, limited work hours to reduce fatigue, 
and vastly improved monitoring equipment.122 Although many of these 
changes can be attributed to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990’s (OPA) 
heightened requirements,123 the PWSRCAC contributed to the changes 
as well.124 For example, the Prince William Sound Council worked with 
Congress and the U.S. Coast Guard to research and apply new double-
hull requirements on tankers, as instructed by the OPA.125 In addition, 
the PWSRCAC has recommended stricter requirements than statutorily 
mandated for various preventative schemes, with varying degrees of 
success.126 Finally, the Prince William Sound Council helped fund a 
research project to identify and mitigate potential weather hazards to 
tankers.127 
 Ice is one of the most significant weather hazards to oil transporta-
tion in Prince William Sound. In fact, the Exxon Valdez diverted from 
its path to avoid hitting icebergs in the 1989 spill, and grounded on the 
reef because it did not return to its proper lane.128 Through research 
gathered in 1993, the PWSRCAC determined that ice reporting needed 
improvement, in large part due to a glacier that generated icebergs that 
floated directly into tanker lanes in the Sound.129 In 2002, the 
PWSRCAC implemented a new ice detection system with the help of 
the U.S. Coast Guard, the Army, the National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Association, the Alaska Department of Environmental Conserva-
tion (ADEC), and other regional entities.130 This project was so success-
ful that a Coast Guard commander deemed the new system “‘the best 
internationally available ice detection technology in existence’” in 
2002.131 
                                                                                                                      
122 See id. at 4–8. 
123 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 2734 (2006) (“Vessel traffic service system”); id. § 2735 (“Equip-
ment and personnel requirements under tank vessel and facility response plans”). 
124 See Joe Banta, 5 Questions About Oil Spills, Sea Briefs (Miss. Ala. Sea Grant Consor-
tium), Summer 2010, http://masgc.org/sbonline/summer10/10q.htm 
125 See id. 
126 See Prince William Sound Reg’l Citizens’ Advisory Council, supra note 114, at 
5–6. 
127 See id. at 8–9. 
128 See id.; Busenberg, supra note 117, at 244. 
129 Busenberg, supra note 117, at 244. A later study, in 1996, found that this glacier 
would likely produce even more marine ice for the next few years, and possibly for dec-
ades. Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. (quoting News Release, Prince William Sound Reg’l Citizens’ Advisory Council, 
Prince William Sound Iceberg Radar Project Comes Online (Dec. 20, 2002), available at 
http://www.pwsrcac.org/newsroom/021220.html). 
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 The PWSRCAC also contributed to improved response measures 
since 1990.132 The Council helps in the development of Geographic 
Response Strategies, which are “map-based strategies that can save time 
during the critical first few hours of an oil spill response” by identifying 
environmentally sensitive areas.133 In addition, the PWSRCAC per-
formed extensive research about the pros and cons of existing response 
techniques such as dispersants and in-situ burning, or the burning of 
oil that is resting on the water.134 Finally, the Council performed many 
research projects concerning contingency plans for first responders to 
use in the event of a future oil spill.135 
2. Research Projects in Prince William Sound 
 The OPA mandated RCACs form environmental monitoring pro-
grams through the funding they receive from the oil industry.136 Pursu-
ant to this requirement, the PWSRCAC launched a long-term environ-
mental monitoring program to compile important environmental data 
starting in 1993.137 This project establishes baseline scientific data gath-
ered at ten sites throughout the Sound that could be used to gauge the 
impact of future spills.138 
 Other Council-sponsored programs monitor the environmental 
impact of the daily use of oil tankers on the Prince William Sound at 
the port of Valdez.139 In addition, the PWSRCAC has funded projects to 
determine if non-indigenous species pose a serious threat to the 
Sound.140 In most of its research studies, the PWSRCAC collaborates 
                                                                                                                      
132 See Prince William Sound Reg’l Citizens’ Advisory Council, supra note 114, at 
10–18. 
133 Id. at 14. 
134 Id. at 16–18. The Council publicly advocated a ban on most uses of dispersants and 
in-situ burning pending future research on both activities because of their potential harm-
ful effects on the environment and questionable benefits to the process of cleaning up oil 
after a spill. See id. at 18. 
135 See Busenberg, supra note 117, at 244. In addition, the Council is involved in review-
ing such contingency plans under the OPA along with ADEC and the U.S. Coast Guard. Id. 
at 243. 
136 See 33 U.S.C. § 2732(b)–(c) (2006); Busenberg, supra note 117, at 242. 
137 Busenberg, supra note 117, at 242. 
138 Prince William Sound Reg’l Citizens’ Advisory Council, supra note 114, at 19. 
The program tests the tissue of mussels from these areas, because they are “filter feeders 
and accumulate toxins from the water.” Id. 
139 See Busenberg, supra note 117, at 243. 
140 Prince William Sound Reg’l Citizens’ Advisory Council, supra note 114, at 20–
21. 
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with other entities such as the oil industry, U.S. Coast Guard, universi-
ties, and research centers to compile this information.141 
3. The Tug Escort System 
 Shortly after its creation, the PWSRCAC began researching oil 
tanker transit and the tug escort system in Prince William Sound.142 Tug 
escorts, newly mandated for oil tanker journeys from Port Valdez to the 
Gulf of Alaska, could assist disabled tankers and keep them from run-
ning aground.143 The PWSRCAC became concerned with transit 
through narrow passages, especially in windy situations.144 From 1992 to 
1997, the Prince William Sound Council, oil industry, U.S. Coast Guard, 
and ADEC worked together to study the system in place and the poten-
tial introduction of tractor tugs.145 
 After the first study revealed that the tankers might run aground 
due to high winds in the Sound, the oil industry introduced changes to 
ameliorate this risk.146 In addition, the study prompted the Coast 
Guard to issue a new rule that prohibited tankers from travelling in 
high wind and wave periods.147 A second study in 1997 showed that 
tankers needed tug vessel assistance at the entrance to the Gulf of 
Alaska; the oil industry immediately complied with this request.148 A 
subsequent study provided the governor of Alaska and ADEC with evi-
dence that best available tug technology, as required by law, could be 
updated with the implementation of tractor tugs.149 
                                                                                                                     
B. Cook Inlet Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council: Successes 
 The mission statement of the Cook Inlet RCAC (CIRCAC or “Cook 
Inlet Council”) is to “represent the citizens of Cook Inlet in promoting 
environmentaly [sic] safe marine transportation and oil facility opera-
 
141 See Busenberg, supra note 117, at 243. 
142 Id. at 246. 
143 Id. 
144 See id. 
145 See id. 
146 See id. (“The oil industry reduced the speed of laden oil tankers in a narrow passage 
of the Sound, and tethered tug vessels to laden tankers in that passage to allow for swift 
assistance.”). 
147 Busenberg, supra note 117, at 246. 
148 Id. (referencing an oil industry insider who stated that this action was taken directly 
because of the study). 
149 Id. 
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tions” in the area.150 To that end, it established two committees: the 
Environmental Monitoring Committee (EMC) and the Prevention, Re-
sponse, Operations & Safety (PROPS) Committee.151 The EMC moni-
tors Cook Inlet to detect environmental harm from oil industry opera-
tions in the region.152 The PROPS Committee primarily researches 
methods to reduce future spills in Cook Inlet, and also reviews spill re-
sponse plans and best available technologies.153 
 The CIRCAC divides its programs into nine main categories: bio-
logical and chemical monitoring, coastal habitat mapping, physical 
oceanography, oils fates and effects, technical review, geographic re-
sponse strategies, prevention and response, risk assessment, and con-
tingency planning.154 The biological and chemical monitoring pro-
gram first identified areas of Cook Inlet where oil industry operations 
were harming the ecosystem, and documented the extent of this dam-
age.155 The program led to the creation of a shoreline database, which 
compiled information on resources and beach characteristics, enabling 
CIRCAC to track its progress in improving the area.156 The coastal habi-
tat mapping program has a similar goal—to create a database of infor-
mation about Cook Inlet that can assist in protecting the shore and re-
acting quickly and efficiently to future harmful change.157 
                                                                                                                      
150 Mission Statement, Cook Inlet Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council, http://www. 
circac.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=60&Itemid=40 (last visited Jan. 
17, 2013). 
151 Volunteers, Cook Inlet Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council, http://www.circac. 
org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=54&Itemid=37 (last visited Jan. 17, 
2013). 
152 Environmental Monitoring Committee, Cook Inlet Regional Citizens’ Advisory 
Council, http://www.circac.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6&Item 
id=14 (last visited Jan. 17, 2013). 
153 See Prevention, Response, Operations and Safety Committee, Cook Inlet Regional Citi-
zens’ Advisory Council, http://www.circac.org/index.php?option=com_content&view= 
article&id=7&Itemid=15 (last visited Jan. 17, 2013). 
154 Programs, Cook Inlet Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council, http://www.circac. 
org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=56&Itemid=4 (last visited Jan. 17, 
2013). 
155 Biological and Chemical Monitoring, Cook Inlet Regional Citizens’ Advisory 
Council, http://www.circac.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout= 
blog&id=10&Itemid=18 (last visited Jan. 17, 2013). 
156 See id. 
157 See Coastal Habitat Mapping, Cook Inlet Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council, 
http://www.circac.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id 
=18&Itemid=33 (last visited Jan. 17, 2013). 
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 The Cook Inlet Council also devoted time to formulating and per-
fecting oil spill response plans.158 The CIRCAC assisted in developing 
multiple geographic response strategies similar to those developed by 
the PWSRCAC.159 These plans, which point the first responders towards 
sensitive areas and the best places for protection resources to be placed, 
can be critically important during the first few hours of spill re-
sponse.160 In 1996 and 2002, the CIRCAC worked on an “oil spill trajec-
tory model,” which could predict the path of oil within Cook Inlet fol-
lowing a spill.161 In addition, the CIRCAC and the PWSRCAC co-
funded the development of other geographic response strategies in 
particularly sensitive areas in Alaska.162 
 Finally, in early 2008, both the CIRCAC and PWSRCAC prepared 
an appellate brief in support of levying punitive damages on Exxon 
Mobil Corporation in the wake of the Exxon Valdez disaster.163 The 
Supreme Court ultimately reduced the punitive damages that the jury 
awarded to the plaintiffs, permitting punitive damages with a ratio of 
one-to-one to the awarded compensatory damages.164 Although the 
RCACs were not completely successful in this case, their assistance to 
plaintiffs is one example of the potential impact RCACs can make be-
yond research and collaborative work effort.165 
C. Shortcomings, Limitations, and Failures of the PWSRCAC and CIRCAC 
1. Subpoena Power 
 The two councils have faced both internal and external limitations 
since their inception.166 Although the OPA requires oil industry coop-
eration and funding of these councils, the statutory authorization of 
RCACs excluded some of the Alaska Oil Spill Commission’s (“Alaska 
                                                                                                                      
158 Geographic Response Strategies, Cook Inlet Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council, 
http://www.circac.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=26&Itemid=34 
(last visited Jan. 17, 2013). 
159 Busenberg, supra note 117, at 248; see supra notes 133–134 and accompanying text. 
160 Geographic Response Strategies, supra note 158. 
161 Busenberg, supra note 117, at 248. Responders could then quickly attend to the 
most threatened areas, which would ideally significantly lower the total environmental 
harm. See id. 
162 Geographic Response Strategies, supra note 158. 
163 Brief for Prince William Sound Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council and Cook Inlet 
Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 9, Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008) (No. 07-219) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae]. 
164 See Baker, 554 U.S. at 476, 515. 
165 See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 163; Baker, 554 U.S. at 476, 515. 
166 See Plater, supra note 16, at 413–15. 
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Commission”) recommendations that could have made them much 
more effective.167 In addition, the OPA limited the Commission’s rec-
ommendation to create RCACs to the state of Alaska.168 
 The statute itself does not grant subpoena authority to either the 
PWSRCAC or CIRCAC.169 Neither group can subpoena information 
and witnesses that could prove extremely important in supplementing 
state oversight.170 Thus, the RCACs must trust in the oil industry’s in-
clination to cooperate with important information requests and cannot 
obtain testimony under oath.171 
2. Funding Limitations Hinder Relationship with Oil Industry 
 Although the OPA provides funding for each RCAC, it does not 
guarantee any amount, and the CIRCAC must continually negotiate 
with the oil industry to maintain its budget.172 A significant difference 
between the RCACs in Prince William Sound and Cook Inlet is their 
funding levels—while the PWSRCAC received $15.1 million from 1990 
through 1996, the CIRCAC received only $3.47 million during that 
same time period.173 In addition, the Cook Inlet Council is small, with 
                                                                                                                      
167 Compare Alaska Oil Spill Comm’n, supra note 29, at 139–40 (envisioning a citizens 
advisory council with subpoena power and extensive duties including advising the gover-
nor and legislature of Alaska on environmental risks), with 33 U.S.C. § 2732(d), (k) (2006) 
(notably failing to grant subpoena power to the councils and omitting any statutory rela-
tionship with the governor or legislature of Alaska), and RCAC Alyeska Contract, supra note 
71, at 3–5, 10–12 (creating a duty to “the public and Alyeska” and not the Alaska govern-
ment, and providing access rights to the RCAC falling short of subpoena power). 
168 See 33 U.S.C. § 2732(b), (d) (establishing Councils in Prince William Sound and 
Cook Inlet, but nowhere else); Alaska Oil Spill Comm’n, supra note 29, at 139–40. The 
Commission, in focusing on the Exxon Valdez oil spill, did not specifically advocate for a 
wider application of its recommendations. Alaska Oil Spill Comm’n, supra note 29, at 
139–40. Had RCACs been expanded nationwide, a council in the Gulf of Mexico may have 
prevented or severely mitigated the harm from the BP Deepwater oil spill in 2010. See 
Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Learning from Disasters: Twenty-One Years After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 
Will Reactions to the Deepwater Horizon Blowout Finally Address the Systemic Flaws Revealed in 
Alaska?, 40 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 11,041, 11,046 (2010). 
169 See Plater, supra note 16, at 414 (suggesting this result may be the result of lobbying 
efforts in Congress). 
170 See id.; see Alaska Oil Spill Comm’n, supra note 29, at 139–40. 
171 Cf. Allison Fisher, The Power of Subpoena, Citizen Energy (Nov. 11, 2010), http:// 
publiccitizenenergy.wordpress.com/2010/11/11/the-power-of-subpoena (discussing simi-
lar problems created by the BP Oil Spill Commission’s lack of subpoena power). 
172 See 33 U.S.C. § 2732(k); Plater, supra note 16, at 414. 
173 George Busenberg, Citizen Advisory Councils and Environmental Management in 
the Marine Oil Trade 32 (1997) (unpublished Technical Report Based on Ph.D. disserta-
tion, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), available at http://www.circac.org/ 
documents/pdf/emc/CACEnvironMg.pdf. 
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only seven staff members.174 These limited resources contribute to a 
significantly reduced track record of policy and governmental successes 
as compared to the PWSRCAC.175 
 Recent budgetary problems led to criticism of the programs, espe-
cially the CIRCAC.176 In a 2010 quarterly meeting, residents of Cook 
Inlet testified to the CIRCAC and spoke of their disappointment in the 
CIRCAC’s weak record of effecting substantive improvements.177 The 
citizens recognized that the CIRCAC’s one million dollar budget was 
the root of many problems, including a lack of oversight that resulted 
in recent close calls that could have led to more oil spill disasters.178 
 In addition, in 2010 the CIRCAC board fired a member, Bob 
Shavelson, after he publicly questioned the Cook Inlet Council’s ac-
tions during a period of time in which they were re-negotiating their 
budget with oil companies.179 Shavelson first raised concerns in a board 
meeting that a CIRCAC report regarding a crude oil tank farm failed to 
acknowledge the temporal connection to their negotiations with Chev-
ron for funding.180 After sending a public letter criticizing the CIRCAC 
for ignoring his objections, the board voted to remove him from of-
fice.181 Shavelson and others have since accused the CIRCAC of being 
completely owned by and at the mercy of the oil industry, and he be-
lieves the CIRCAC system is “irreparably broken.”182 These concerned 
participants and observers suggest the only way to maintain the integ-
rity of the RCACs is to completely sever their relationship with the oil 
industry, and have Congress mandate their funding from another 
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source.183 In the alternative, some environmentalists limit their criti-
cisms to the municipalities in Cook Inlet that are especially tied to the 
oil industry, suggesting their voting rights alone should be limited.184 
Another suggested solution is to create whistleblower security for RCAC 
members who discover and wish to publicly publish documentation of 
any evidence of impropriety between the oil industry and RCACs.185 
3. The RCACs’ Advisory Authority Limitations and Failed Policy 
Proposals 
 In 1996, the CIRCAC proposed that the industry consider using a 
tug in the Cook Inlet to help guide disabled tankers.186 This proposal 
came from the Cook Inlet Council alone, and the oil industry in the 
area opposed it, arguing that a sufficient response vessel that could re-
spond to tankers in need already existed.187 ADEC and the U.S. Coast 
Guard neither opposed nor supported the proposal; the Coast Guard 
did not possess the authority needed to require a tug, and neither party 
perceived the Inlet as a danger zone because of its small size as com-
pared with Prince William Sound.188 Without this political support, the 
Alaska legislature did not address the issue.189 The CIRCAC did suc-
cessfully “encourag[e] the local oil industry to test and improve the 
towing abilities of the response vessel stationed in the Inlet,” but no 
proposal exists for the development of a tug vessel in the Inlet.190 
                                                                                                                     
 Both RCACs have experienced difficulty in implementing im-
proved oil spill response systems.191 The PWSRCAC reviews contin-
gency plans for the Prince William Sound, which are used for oil spill 
prevention and response by the oil industry.192 Under the OPA, every 
oil tanker operator must have a contingency plan if they intend to ship 
in the waters of Alaska.193 In 1994, the PWSRCAC developed a “stan-
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dard protocol” for its review of contingency plans, and pursuant to this 
protocol, reviewed all existing plans that same year.194 Despite this, the 
Prince William Sound Council “has faced a generally unfavorable po-
litical context in attempting to enhance the contingency plans for the 
Sound.”195 Although the oil industry has improved their response plans 
since the Exxon Valdez spill, the PWSRCAC has lobbied for even more 
protections.196 ADEC has not funded PWSRCAC’s proposals, and has 
merely approved preexisting oil industry contingency plans—without 
ADEC’s support, the PWSRCAC has not sufficiently persuaded the in-
dustry to enhance the plans.197 
 Similarly, the CIRCAC has tried and failed to improve oil spill re-
sponse systems in Cook Inlet.198 The CIRCAC, like the PWSRCAC, re-
views all contingency plans for oil tankers in the region, and has devel-
oped standard reviewing protocols.199 As a result of these reviews, the 
Cook Inlet Council has proposed various policy changes that both the 
ADEC and the oil industry have ignored.200 Although the CIRCAC has 
called for more coordination between the government and oil industry 
in the planning process and the “incorporation of oil firefighting strate-
gies into the contingency plans,” neither has supported the Council.201 
III. Expansion (or Lack Thereof) of RCACs from 1990 to 2012 
A. BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
 In response to the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon blowout, President 
Obama established a National Commission on the BP Deepwater Hori-
zon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (“BP Commission”) in May 2010.202 
President Obama directed the BP Commission to “examine the rele-
vant facts and circumstances concerning the root causes of the Deepwa-
ter Horizon oil disaster” and “develop options for guarding against, and 
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mitigating the impact of, oil spills associated with offshore drilling.”203 
The BP Commission presented a Final Report to the President in Janu-
ary 2011.204 The Final Report investigated the events surrounding the 
explosion and made recommendations for measures to prevent a fu-
ture similar event.205 
 The BP Commission found that the Macondo well explosion could 
have been prevented, and the causes of the blowout “reveal[ed] such 
systematic failures in risk management that they [put] in doubt the 
safety culture of the entire industry.”206 Specifically, the Final Report 
noted that, prior to the blowout, “neither industry nor government 
adequately addressed” the risks of offshore drilling, and “[a]bsent ma-
jor crises, and given the remarkable financial returns available from 
deepwater reserves, the business culture succumbed to a false sense of 
security.”207 Just as in Alaska in 1989, the citizens most harmed by the 
blowout—oyster farmers, fishermen, tourism proprietors, and oil-rig 
workers—had been excluded from the decision-making process that 
culminated in the blowout.208 
 Going forward, the Final Report called for increased regulatory 
oversight by the government and significant improvements in the oil 
and gas industries’ own safety practices.209 In addition, the BP Commis-
sion emphasized the need to improve local coordination and involve-
ment in spill response planning.210 Using RCACs established in the Oil 
Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) as a guide, the Final Report called on 
Congress to create a similar structure in the Gulf.211 The BP Commis-
sion found that local officials’ exclusion from response planning had 
hampered the efficacy of the cleanup and led to citizen mistrust of the 
efforts.212 Groups enabling citizens to become more involved in pre-
vention and response planning could “prevent industry and govern-
ment complacency, and increase public trust in response opera-
tions.”213 
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 The Final Report envisioned a Gulf council to “broadly represent 
the citizens’ interests in the area, such as fishing and tourism,” and con-
templated the possible inclusion of oil industry representatives as non-
voting members.214 Those who held leases in Gulf offshore drilling 
would fund the group.215 Instead of a pure advisory role, the BP Com-
mission recommended that government officials “be required to con-
sult with the council on relevant issues, that operators provide the 
council with access to records and other information, and that entities 
. . . declining the council’s advice submit their reasons to the council in 
writing.”216 This would give the Gulf council a significant role in the 
future of offshore drilling practices.217 
B. The Proposed Gulf of Mexico Independent Regional Citizens’  
Advisory Counsel 
 While calls to implement RCACs in the Gulf of Mexico in the wake 
of the BP Deepwater Horizon blowout resulted in their inclusion in 
proposed bills, Congress has not enacted such a bill.218 Almost immedi-
ately following the Deepwater Horizon disaster, both Democrats and 
Republicans in the Senate introduced bills responding to the oil spill.219 
Both bills primarily addressed liability issues and what party should have 
to pay response costs in the event of an oil spill.220 The Senate, however, 
was unable to agree on a final version of either bill and did not pass a 
law.221 Representative Laura Richardson introduced a similar bill on De-
cember 20, 2011, entitled the Securing Health for Ocean Resources and 
Environment (SHORE) Act.222 In January 2012 the House referred the 
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bill to the House Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Sub-
committee on Energy and Mineral Resources, and Subcommittee on 
Fisheries and Insular Affairs, but no action has since been taken.223 
 The SHORE Act includes a provision to create a Gulf of Mexico 
RCAC (GMRCAC or “Gulf Council”) analogous to the RCACs in Alaska 
by inserting a provision into the OPA.224 Voting representatives of the 
states surrounding the Gulf of Mexico and nonvoting members from 
various government and maritime agencies would comprise the Gulf 
Council.225 Citizen appointments would last for three years and the 
council would be self-governing.226 In addition, the Gulf Council would 
have three primary duties: to monitor the oil industry in the Gulf of 
Mexico, make recommendations to research institutes and assist oil spill 
recovery efforts, and “conduct such other activities within the authority 
and scope of the Council as the Council considers appropriate.”227 
 The SHORE Act provisions contain a few significant departures 
from the OPA language.228 First, while the SHORE Act would not ex-
plicitly grant the GMRCAC subpoena power, it would allow “access to 
oil and gas industry facilities and records that are relevant to the 
proper execution of the duties of the Council.”229 In addition, although 
the SHORE Act would retain the oil industry as the Gulf Council’s 
source of funding, the budget would be capped at ten million dollars 
per year—more than three times the Prince William Sound RCAC’s 
(PWSRCAC or “Prince William Sound Council”) budget.230 Moreover, 
the SHORE Act would grant the power to establish the budget to the 
“Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating” 
rather than the Gulf Council and the oil industry.231 
 Immediately following the initial introduction of the SHORE Act, 
a delegation of Gulf Coast residents met with the PWSRCAC members 
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to learn about RCACs and how they work.232 The oil industry, however, 
voiced concerns about the bill, stating that they already consult with 
citizens in the region, and were concerned about the exclusion of cer-
tain groups from the Councils, such as drilling rig workers.233 
 Senator Harry Reid proposed a similar bill on July 28, 2010, the 
Clean Energy Jobs and Oil Company Accountability Act of 2010 
(“Clean Energy Jobs Act”), that never became law, and has not yet been 
reintroduced in the current session of Congress.234 The Clean Energy 
Jobs Act also contained a provision establishing a citizens’ council in 
the Gulf of Mexico.235 Instead of amending the OPA, the Clean Energy 
Jobs Act would have mandated the President establish a local RCAC 
within 270 days of the passage of the Act.236 The council’s mission was 
to provide advice to federal agencies and the energy industry regarding 
offshore drilling in the Gulf of Mexico.237 Requirements for member-
ship were vague, providing only general guidelines to the President in 
choosing members.238 In addition, under the Clean Energy Jobs Act, 
the President would have created a plan for the “operation of the 
Council,” including a description of its duties, the weight to be assigned 
to the council’s recommendations, and the source of its funding.239 
 More recently, on July 6, 2012, Congress enacted the Resources 
and Ecosystem Sustainability, Tourist Opportunities, and Revived 
Economies of the Gulf Coast States Act of 2012 (“RESTORE Act”) in 
direct response to the Gulf Oil Spill.240 Despite the fact that many saw 
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the BP Deepwater Horizon blowout as “an opportunity” which would 
expose the “true costs of [America’s] energy policy,” the opportunity 
remains unrealized as the biggest policy change in the wake of the dis-
aster focused exclusively on the past by creating a Gulf Coast Restora-
tion Trust Fund to help restore the damaged areas.241 
IV. Applying the Lessons from the Alaska RCACs to the Rest of 
the United States to Prevent Future Oil Spills 
 A comparison of the two existing RCACs in Alaska illustrates the 
successes, shortcomings, and areas of improvement in this innovative 
method of citizen oversight.242 Properly formulated and implemented, 
RCACs have the potential to become an integral part of environmental 
enforcement of the oil industry, and could potentially be expanded 
into many different areas of environmental law.243 To do this, however, 
legislators must understand how to improve on existing citizens’ coun-
cils in the future by fully appreciating their successes and limitations.244 
A. What Works and What Does Not in Existing RCACs 
 The successes and failures of the two Alaskan RCACs correlate 
strongly to their statutory formation, and what was ultimately included 
and excluded from the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA).245 One of the 
most important attributes of the citizens’ councils is their autonomy 
from the oil industry despite the fact that it is the source of their fund-
ing.246 The OPA addresses this problem by specifying the voting and 
nonvoting members of RCACs and thus prohibiting any representative 
of the oil industry from having an official role in either RCAC.247 The 
OPA prohibits oil industry representatives from even being part of the 
nonvoting faction of the board of either council.248 However, as Bob 
Shavelson’s removal from the Cook Inlet RCAC (CIRCAC or “Cook 
Inlet Council”) board in 2010 illustrates, this problem has not been ob-
                                                                                                                      
241 See Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act §§ 1601–1608; Bryan Walsh, 
What Ever Happened to the Gulf Oil Spill?, Time (Dec. 20, 2010), http://www.time.com/ 
time/health/article/0,8599,2037876,00.html. 
242 See infra notes 245–276 and accompanying text. 
243 See infra notes 277–303 and accompanying text. 
244 See infra notes 277–303 and accompanying text. 
245 See supra notes 61–111 and accompanying text. 
246 See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2732(k) (2006); Klouda, supra note 176. 
247 See 33 U.S.C. § 2732(d)(2). 
248 See id. § 2732(d)(2)(B) (excluding oil industry representatives from the “Nonvoting 
members” section of the Act). 
326 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 40:297 
viated through statutory construct alone.249 Shavelson and others have 
accused the CIRCAC of being beholden to the oil industry in Cook 
Inlet, and allowing this to reduce its effectiveness at monitoring the in-
dustry.250 
 As Shavelson’s experience with CIRCAC illustrates, the source of 
the oil industry’s continuing impact—despite the existing statutory 
framework—might be the RCACs’ funding sources.251 As established by 
the OPA, approval of any National Contingency Plan (NCP) is contin-
gent on “the owners or operators of terminal facilities or crude oil 
tankers” in the Prince William Sound and Cook Inlet funding each 
RCAC respectively.252 The amount of funding, as established by the 
OPA, “may be adjusted periodically upon the mutual consent of the 
owners or operators of terminal facilities or crude oil tankers operat-
ing” in Prince William Sound and Cook Inlet, and the Councils of both 
areas.253 Therefore, under the terms of the OPA, while funding is guar-
anteed, both RCACs must periodically renegotiate their funding 
amounts with the oil industry.254 The Prince William Sound RCAC’s 
(PWSRCAC or “Prince William Sound Council”) contract with Aleyska 
Pipeline Service Company (“Alyeska”) (the “Contract”), which guaran-
tees funding and does not contain a provision requiring the two parties 
to renegotiate the amount on a regular basis, supersedes this arrange-
ment.255 Therefore, the CIRCAC’s reliance on renegotiations leaves 
that council’s actions vulnerable to criticism, while the PWSRCAC’s 
guaranteed funding avoids this problem.256 
 Another key provision of the OPA regarding RCACs is the list of 
each council’s responsibilities.257 While RCACs’ duties are broadly de-
fined and initially appear quite expansive, they are severely limited by 
the councils’ advisory function.258 The OPA directs each RCAC to moni-
tor the oil industry, review prevention and contingency plans, and make 
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recommendations to modify and improve the existing infrastructure, yet 
the Act does not compel any government agency or corporation to ac-
tually follow this advice.259 This has had a significant effect on the coun-
cils’ successes and shortcomings since 1990.260Although the councils 
have been successful at implementing some policy goals since 1990, 
each example of a success involves collaboration with the industry or a 
government body, allowing the RCAC to extend beyond its advisory ca-
pacity.261 When RCACs work alone, they are rarely as successful.262 
 Most, if not all, of the successes of RCACs have been directly tied 
to their ability to work with other organizations to accomplish their 
goals.263 Many changes that the PWSRCAC takes credit for have come 
about through collaboration with the U.S. Coast Guard or the Alaska 
Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC).264 For example, 
when the PWSRCAC implemented a new ice detection system in 2002, 
they did so with the help of the Coast Guard, Army, National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Association, and ADEC.265 Similarly, improvements to 
the tug escort system through Prince William Sound, although sup-
ported by the PWSRCAC, were not fully implemented until the oil in-
dustry, the Coast Guard, and ADEC agreed to work with the Prince Wil-
liam Sound Council to produce a study.266 In these and other 
examples, the PWSRCAC essentially used these collaborations to cir-
cumvent their advisory function to accomplish their regulatory goals.267 
                                                                                                                     
 Many of the accomplishments of RCACs are directly related to 
amalgamating research on the effects of the Exxon Valdez oil spill and 
data to assist responders in the event of a future oil spill.268 Although 
these efforts have improved the chances that the harm of future spills 
will be significantly mitigated, these research projects have no direct 
effect on the actions of the oil industry or on the prevention of future 
 
259 See 33 U.S.C. § 2732(b)(2), (d)(6). 
260 See supra notes 112–201 and accompanying text. 
261 See supra notes 112–185 and accompanying text (summarizing each council’s success-
ful endeavors, each of which was supported by the oil industry or a government agency). 
262 See supra notes 186–201 and accompanying text (summarizing each Council’s un-
successful attempts at policy change; in each case, no government agency or oil company 
was willing to support the Council). 
263 See Busenberg, supra note 117, at 250 (“Collaborations have played a role in all of 
the eight project categories examined in this study.”) 
264 See supra notes 121–149 and accompanying text. 
265 See supra notes 128–131 and accompanying text. 
266 Busenberg, supra note 117, at 246. 
267 See supra notes 121–149 and accompanying text. 
268 See supra notes 132–149, 155–162 and accompanying text. 
328 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 40:297 
spills.269 As federally created entities, they can and should focus their 
time and expertise on making concrete changes in legislation and the 
industry itself.270 
 A final important limiting characteristic of existing RCACs is sub-
poena power, a feature omitted from the OPA.271 In its recommenda-
tion to create citizens’ advisory councils, the Alaska Oil Spill Commis-
sion explicitly envisioned giving such councils subpoena power so they 
could effectively collect information about the oil industry.272 Instead, 
the OPA merely directs RCACs to “monitor” and “review” the oil indus-
try without providing them with a statutory means by which to access 
the industry’s data.273 The PWSRCAC secured some additional powers 
through its contract with Alyeska, which gave the Prince William Sound 
Council access to Alyeska’s records and documents, and permitted 
members of the council to inspect Alyeska’s facilities.274 The Contract 
limited the PWSRCAC’s access to those documents that the EPA and 
other agencies have access while simultaneously excluding confidential 
data in some situations.275 The Contract severely hampered the 
PWSRCAC’s inspection rights by requiring advance notice to Alyeska—
essentially negating this mechanism’s impact by providing the facility 
ample time to correct any violations.276 
                                                                                                                     
B. Three Primary Ways to Improve RCACs and Expand Them to the  
Gulf of Mexico and Elsewhere 
1. General Solutions 
 Analyzing the Alaska RCACs’ past performance through the lens 
of their statutory structure provides a clear view of a successful 
RCAC.277 An effective citizens’ group should have the ability to affect 
changes in the oil industry by providing a roadblock to the “compla-
cent” relationship between the industry and government officials.278 
There are two primary ways in which a citizens’ council can accomplish 
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this goal: either through directly proposing and implementing policy 
changes, or by producing public research to force the government and 
oil industry to improve existing law.279 The PWSRCAC and CIRCAC 
have attempted both to some extent, and while the PWSRCAC has had 
some success, there are ways of improving both methods.280 
 To give RCACs a more authoritative voice in directly affecting pol-
icy changes, an improved statute must remove the advisory function 
limitation and replace it with actual decision-making power.281 The cur-
rent system severely handicaps the RCACs’ ability to accomplish any-
thing beyond research and gathering data, unless the councils are will-
ing to work with other groups and those other groups are willing to 
cooperate.282 The oil industry must fund the RCACs to obtain approval 
of their NCP;283 requiring the industry to implement RCAC recom-
mendations for NCP approval as well, would provide an effective way to 
force the industry to take note of RCACs. It is unlikely, however, that 
the oil industry would allow such a provision to pass in a federal stat-
ute.284 A less extreme option would be to include a provision requiring 
the legislature and oil industry to provide compelling evidence in a 
written record any time it elected to ignore a recommendation from an 
RCAC.285 The current system limits the powers of RCACs to the extent 
that the oil industry and government may completely ignore RCAC 
recommendations unless the political climate makes it favorable not to 
do so.286 The most feasible way to avoid this pitfall is to force the oil in-
dustry and government to consider each recommendation from a 
RCAC and face tangible repercussions if they do not.287 
 RCACs must also be granted more autonomy from the oil industry 
through improved funding structures.288 Independence is an essential 
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part of RCACs, as their fundamental role is to provide a third source of 
input regarding the industry, not supplement an existing one.289 This 
factor is perhaps the biggest distinction between the PWSRCAC and 
CIRCAC, and the best explanation as to their different accomplish-
ments.290 The OPA’s mandate that the oil industry be removed com-
pletely from the RCACs’ decision-making process is essentially negated 
by its provision that the two parties renegotiate funding on a regular 
basis.291 As illustrated by the CIRCAC, this provision can force the 
Councils to cede to oil industry interests, especially during key negotia-
tion periods.292 This reduces the effectiveness of the RCACs, and de-
stroys their public perception as a citizens’ group.293 In the future, pro-
visions creating RCACs should include language akin to the funding 
provision in the PWSRCAC’s contract with Alyeska, which has proven 
much more successful at creating and maintaining autonomy.294 
 In addition, another shortfall of the CIRCAC comes from its very 
members.295 Unlike in Prince William Sound, many municipalities in 
Cook Inlet are almost completely dependent on the oil industry.296 
Therefore, the citizens who make up the voting portion of the board of 
directors are invariably beholden to the oil industry despite the OPA’s 
attempt to sever these ties.297 Analyzing which municipalities within the 
applicable region are especially beholden to the industry and removing 
their voting powers would avoid this problem.298 For this reason, a whis-
tleblower protection provision that would protect individuals who ques-
tion the loyalty of board members is a necessary component of a future 
RCAC.299 
 The final essential element of the RCACs, which requires attention 
and improvement, is their lack of subpoena power over the oil indus-
try.300 Currently, the CIRCAC has no recourse to compel companies to 
provide it with paperwork or allow its members to inspect facilities, and 
the advance notice requirement significantly limits the PWSRCAC’s 
                                                                                                                      
289 See id.; Alaska Oil Spill Comm’n, supra note 29, at 206. 
290 See Klouda, supra note 72; supra notes 186–201 and accompanying text. 
291 See 33 U.S.C. § 2732(d)(2), (k)(2)–(3). 
292 See Klouda, supra note 72. 
293 See id.; Klouda, supra note 176. 
294 See RCAC Alyeska Contract, supra note 71, at 8–9. 
295 See Horton, supra note 180. 
296 See id. at 4. 
297 See id.; 33 U.S.C. § 2732(d)(2) (2006). 
298 See Horton, supra note 180, at 4. 
299 See id. at 6–7. 
300 See Plater, supra note 16, at 414. 
2013] RCACs: Citizen Watchdog Monitors for the Oil Industry 331 
power as a watchdog.301 As the Alaska Oil Spill Commission and Na-
tional Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Off-
shore Drilling (“BP Commission) (collectively, the “Commissions”) 
suggested, the subpoena power is an important and necessary part of a 
successful RCAC, and this power is one of the only ways the councils 
can actually influence the decisions of the oil industry.302 Going for-
ward, Congress must five RCACs power to compel oil executives to co-
operate fully with their demands, especially because the Commissions 
cited this as one of the most prominent causes of both oil spills.303 
2. Application to the Gulf of Mexico 
 Despite inclusion of RCACs in proposed bills, Congress has not 
authorized any RCACs since the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill.304 The 
text of the proposals would implement some of the improvements this 
Note suggests but ignores some shortcomings.305 
 The Securing Health for Ocean Resource and Environment 
(SHORE) Act maintains the broad access power called for by the BP 
Commission,306 and thus provides a future Gulf of Mexico RCAC 
(GMRCAC or “Gulf Council”) with an important and influential posi-
tion over the oil industry. In addition, rather than requiring a RCAC 
and its industry funders to negotiate over the budget, the SHORE Act 
would give this role to the U.S. Coast Guard instead.307 This would re-
duce the likelihood of the Gulf Council becoming dependent on the 
industry and would increase the likelihood that it would maintain its 
independence.308 This provision alone, however, would not automati-
cally lead to an autonomous RCAC.309 As in Cook Island, many resi-
dents of the states in the Gulf of Mexico are dependent on the offshore 
drilling industry, and giving voting power to representatives from these 
municipalities could lead to the same problems that exist in the CIR-
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CAC.310 While the problem would likely not be as extreme in the Gulf 
because of the competing tourism industry, an act creating RCACs in 
the area should address this potential issue.311 To do this, Congress 
could designate representatives from geographical areas carefully 
formed through research and designed to ensure that the oil industry 
is not the predominant employer in that area,312 or simply include a 
provision in the statute conditioning funding on the RCAC’s record of 
taking steps to protect the environment. 
 Finally, the SHORE Act designated the GMRCAC as purely advi-
sory, similar to the PWSRCAC and CIRCAC.313 To ensure that the 
RCAC can effectively monitor and change the oil industry’s future ac-
tions in the Gulf of Mexico, the SHORE Act should instead implement 
the recommendations of the BP Commission and require federal regu-
lators “to consult with the council on relevant issues,” mandating that 
all entities that decline the “council’s advice submit their reasons to the 
council in writing.”314 In this way, the efforts of the GMRCAC would be 
guaranteed to be considered in important policy decisions.315 
Conclusion 
 The development and expansion of RCACs is a crucial next step 
that the federal government must take in the prevention and mitiga-
tion of future oil spills. The two existing RCACs in Alaska provide both 
a compelling argument for the potential of these innovative citizens’ 
groups and a clear example of what steps must be taken to improve 
them. 
 Since the creation of RCACs in 1990, the two Alaska councils have 
collaborated in creating new policy guidelines and regulations for safe 
oil transport in the area, disseminated a significant amount of knowl-
edge to the public about the oil industry in general, and become a sig-
nificant source of research and information designed to address the 
threat of future oil spills. This structure, however, has the power to do 
more. It is clear from the recent BP Deepwater Horizon blowout in the 
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Gulf of Mexico that the systematic problems evident in the oil industry 
have not disappeared. Citizens have always played a role in environ-
mental regulation and litigation, but through the inventive structure of 
RCACs they could have a much more meaningful role in monitoring 
the relationship between the oil industry and the government and ul-
timately protecting the environment. 
 If RCACs expand, Congress must make three significant changes 
to their structure to ensure their success moving forward. First, they 
must have subpoena power over the oil industry so they are not forced 
to rely on oil company cooperation. This check on the industry would 
enable the RCACs to make meaningful recommendations, perform 
important research, and create an incentive for the industry itself to 
self-police. Second, while funding for RCACs can and should remain 
the responsibility of the oil industry, the process of negotiating the 
amount of funding must be removed from the day-to-day operations of 
the RCACs. Otherwise, as illustrated by the Cook Inlet RCAC, there will 
be well-founded criticism of the councils’ actions and general distrust 
of board members’ motives. Finally, and most importantly, RCACs must 
be allowed to expand from their existing advisory function. Forcing the 
oil industry to heed their advice by conditioning acceptance of contin-
gency plans on a system in which the oil companies review and respond 
to that advice is the only feasible way to ensure that these RCACs can 
accomplish their goal of preventing future oil spill disasters. 
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